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Abstract 
In this paper, I seek to explain the causes of the massive migratory flows from Turkey to Greece since 
August 2015. The context of conflict and regional turbulence in the Middle East, together with several 
events taking place at the beginning of 2015, in which Turkey was directly or indirectly involved, 
triggered in August the unprecedented refugee crisis that we are still witnessing today. These events 
led to a sea change, in the period of the 9th to the 14th of August, in the Turkish position towards 
refugees and in the Syrian refugees’ willingness to wait in Turkey till the end of the war in Syria. The 
intersection, during these days, between Turkey’s decreasing interest in receiving and controlling 
Syrian refugees within its territories and the increasing motivation of a significant number of Syrian 
refugees to leave Turkey, sparked the beginning of the current refugee crisis in the Eastern 
Mediterranean route. Finally, I will argue that this refugee crisis has accelerated the EU-Turkey 
accession negotiations in an unprecedented way, and at the same time has increased the leverage 
power of Turkey. 
Keywords 
Refugees, European Union, Turkey, migration, refugee crisis. 
 1 
Introduction 
Since the summer of 2015, the phenomenon of the massive arrivals of refugees on Greek shores and 
the shocking images of refugees trying to get to Germany by crossing the Western Balkans has 
demanded the attention of politicians, media and experts.  
It is the question of how to offer a response to the current refugee crisis in Europe, as well as the 
analysis of the decisions of EU leaders in redistributing the Syrian refugees, that has mostly captured 
the world’s attention. However, all the analysis offered so far has left aside or overlooked two key 
questions: First, why is it that so many refugees and migrants have arrived since August 2015? 
Second, why are they currently arriving on Greek shores? Both questions have been attributed to the 
existence of smuggler networks, the war in Syria or to the advance of the Islamic State’s positions in 
the Middle East. However, all three factors have been present over the last three years, without 
causing such huge numbers of refugees and migrants to arrive on Greek shores.  
Therefore, to date, a comprehensive analysis has not been offered, to explain why so many refugees 
and migrants have arrived on the shores of Greece from Turkey since the summer of 2015. This paper 
seeks to fill this gap by linking the analysis of two key aspects that are often neglected: First, I will 
analyse the push-factors of flows of irregular migration and asylum-seekers in the Mediterranean, 
from a global and international perspective. To this end I carry out an analysis that takes into account 
not only the context in Syria, but also traces the origins of the main nationalities arriving in Greece. 
Second, it is necessary to understand the role and context of Turkey in relation to the massive 
arrival at the Greek shores from Turkey since the summer of 2015. Although all the refugees and 
migrants arriving in Greece have had to cross the whole of Turkish territory before boarding a boat at 
the Turkish shores, the role played by Turkey in the current refugee crisis has been overlooked or put 
aside. This is surprising, if we take into account that usually the attention of politicians and the media 
tends to focus on the last transit state from where migratory flows board ship to reach Europe.
1
 In 
carrying out this analysis, I will argue that the massive migratory flows from Turkey to Greece since 
August 2015 can be explained as the result of four main factors, of which two converged from the 9
th
 
to the 14
th
 of August 2015, triggering an unprecedented and uncontrollable number of arrivals. The 
first of these factors is the unprecedented context of conflict and regional turbulence in the Middle 
East that has existed for years and is increasingly unlikely to end any time soon. Second, events and 
political decisions in the EU borderlands and Syria’s neighbouring countries have caused a funnel 
effect, cornering and concentrating a significant number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Third, since the 
beginning of 2015 several factors have pushed the Turkish government to switch its foreign policy 
strategy regarding the Syrian conflict and its attitude to the Syrian refugees arriving or living in 
Turkey. And fourth, decisions by the Turkish government in 2015, as well as the latest developments 
of the Syrian war, have pushed ever more Syrian refugees into leaving Turkey, seeking a better life in 
Europe. These events and developments taking place from the 9
th
 to the 14
th
 of August 2015 led the 
third and fourth of these factors to converge, causing the current situation in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
To conclude, I will argue that this refugee crisis has accelerated the EU-Turkey accession 
negotiations in an unprecedented way, at the same time as increasing Turkey’s leverage power. In 
recent decades the EU has mostly managed to control migration flows by fortifying its external 
territorial borders, as well as by creating buffer zones at the EU borderlands (Del Sarto 2010). 
However, the current refugee crisis shows that these control measures have proved to be useless 
without the support of Turkey. In other words, the EU has vulnerable dependency (Keohane and Nye 
                                                     
1
 The migratory flows reaching Italy in 2011 were explained by the political situation in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya during 
the Arab Spring, and the flows arriving in Italy in 2014 were attributed to the chaotic situation in Libya.  
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2012, 10-11) on Turkey, if vulnerability is seen as the inability of the EU to adopt alternatives when 
facing external changes (in this case the refugee crisis). Moreover, because of the EU’s fears, and its 
need to control migration, Turkey is managing to use its cooperation on migration control as an 
“effective card” (Cassarino 2009 and 2010) to pressure the EU and in turn to obtain significant 
benefits.  
1. Magnitude and origins of the refugee crisis on European shores 
Since the summer of 2015, the migration flows have been generally summed up as a Syrian refugee 
crisis. However, the refugees and migrants arriving on the Greek and Italian shores also come from 
other regions and conflicts. In order to understand and evaluate the nature and magnitude of the 
present refugee crisis it is necessary to contrast and observe the origins and push-factors of the people 
arriving on European shores.  
Although the Syrian conflict might play an important role in the present refugee crisis, it is 
important to remember that in 2014 “only” 25% of the total migrants that arrived in Italy by sea were 
Syrian nationals (41,941 of the total 170,099). In 2015, more Eritreans (37,796), Nigerians (19,576), 
Somalis (11,020) and Sudanese (8,692) have arrived on the Italian coast than Syrians (7,232) (see 
Graph 3).
2
  
Regarding the flows arriving on the Greek shores, up to the 1
st
 of August 2015, of 340,991 people 
that arrived in Greece, half of them (175,375) were Syrians. The other half came from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Albania and Iraq, among other countries.
3
 Moreover as I explain later, the proportion of 
Syrian refugees arriving on the Greek coasts since the beginning of June has increased (see Graph 2) 
compared to other nationalities.  
Several data stress the need to analyse carefully the events that have taken place in Syria and its 
neighbouring countries, in order to understand the current refugee crisis. First of all, no clear reason 
has yet been acknowledged for the increase in arrivals in Greece, from 65,282 migrants at the end of 
June 2015 to 399,326 at the end of September 2015. In other words, more than 334 thousand people 
arrived in Greece from Turkey in less than three months. To keep the figures in perspective, this 
means that the number of people that reached Greece from Turkey in the summer of 2015 is twice the 
number of migrants that arrived in Italy during the whole of year 2014. This is also four times the 
number of people that arrived in Italy in 2011, as a consequence of the revolts in the Maghreb during 
the Arab Spring (64,261).  
In case this is not sufficiently clear, if we aggregate the arrivals of migrants, by all routes, in 
Europe in 2013 and 2014 (107,365 and 283,532 respectively) the sum is similar to the total number of 
arrivals in Greece alone, between August and November 2015. Therefore, there is no doubt that we are 
experiencing an exceptional situation that demands all our attention, if we are to understand the factors 
causing it.  
Indeed, by taking the data collected by the IOM Missing Migrants Project it has been possible to 
trace approximately the periodical waves of maritime arrivals of migrants in Italy and Greece since the 
beginning of June. This record of arrivals allows us to observe an astonishing fact that seems to have 
been neglected till now: from the 9
th
 to the 14
th
 of August 2015 an unprecedented wave of migrants 
arrived in Greece from Turkey (see Graph 1), more precisely 42.000 migrants in less than 5 days.
4
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 Curiously, Libyan migrants do not even rank among the top ten nationalities that reached Italy by sea in 2014 and 2015. 
3
 See Missing Migrants Project of the International Organization for Migration. 
4
 Again to keep these figures in perspective, the number of migrants/refugees that arrived on the Greek coasts during these 
5 days is similar to the total number of arrivals in Greece for the whole year of 2014. 
Analysing the Causes of the Refugee Crisis and the Key Role of Turkey: Why Now and Why So Many? 
3 
As we can see in Graph 1, from the beginning of June till the 9
th
 of August 2015, both destinations, 
Italy and Greece, were experiencing the same daily rate of arrivals. For example, at the end of March 
both destinations had received a similar total number of arrivals (10,252 in Italy and 14,151 in 
Greece).
5
 However, after the 9
th
 of August the Eastern Mediterranean route saw an exponential 
growth. This growth went from a total of 92,491 arrivals by August the 9
th 
to 134,988 by August the 
14
th
, and continued at this impressive rate till the total of arrivals by November the 17th stood at 
685,758.  
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Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani 
4 
Graph 1: Migrant maritime arrivals in Italy and Greece from 9
th
 June to the 17
th
 November 2015 
 
Source: own elaboration from IOM Missing Migrants Project 
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Graph 2: Migrant maritime arrivals in Greece by nationality from 1
st
 April to 1
st
 October 2015 
 
Source: own elaboration from IOM Missing Migrants Project 
Graph 3: Migrant maritime arrivals in Italy by nationality from 1
st
 April to 1
st
 of October 2015 
 
Source: own elaboration from IOM Missing Migrants Project 
Observing the arrivals by nationality (Graph 2), we can see that on the Eastern Mediterranean route, 
most of the people arriving in Greece are Syrian refugees. However, it is interesting to observe that 
whereas in April 2015 the number of Syrians and Afghans arriving in Greece was approximately the 
same, we can see that since June 2015, the arrival of Syrian refugees has exponentially increased 
compared to the Afghan, Iraqi and Pakistani refugees.  
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In the case of the Central Mediterranean route we can see that in contrast to the eastern route, it has 
maintained a similar rate of arrivals till October 2015. Although the Eastern Mediterranean route has 
been the centre of attention since the summer of 2015, we must not forget that 143,114 migrants have 
also arrived in Italy from January to November 2015. Following the present rate of arrivals,
6
 Italy will 
receive a similar total number of migrants this year to that of 2014. Analysing this route by nationality, 
we can see that the proportion of Eritreans, Nigerians and Somalis arriving on the Italian shores has 
increased since April 2015 (see next Graph 3), while the rate of Syrians taking this route seems to 
decrease since the beginning of August.  
These data raise several questions such as: What happened between the 9
th
 and 14
th
 of August 2015 
to provoke such a dramatic increase in refugees arriving on the Greek shores? Why have so many 
Syrian refugees decided to get to Europe by the Eastern Mediterranean route, instead of the previously 
generally used Central Mediterranean route? Why have so many Syrian refugees decided to migrate to 
Europe since the beginning of the summer 2015?  
2. Analysing the origins of the refugee crisis  
In order to answer the previous questions it is necessary to understand that the first reason for the 
current refugee crisis lies in the fact that the current turbulent, violent and unstable context in Africa 
and the Middle East has brought together migrants and refugees from different origins, all seeking a 
better life in Europe. Although Syrian refugees are the main nationality arriving on European shores, 
other nationalities are also forced to migrate due to the tragic situations in their home countries.  
Afghanistan has suffered not only more than a decade of economic and political instability, but 
above all the increasing insurgent activity led by the Taliban, which has caused more than 5,000 civil 
casualties this year according to the UN.
7
 This explains why the Afghan community is currently the 
second largest group of refugees to have reached European territory, as well as the second largest 
group of refugees in the world (2,6 million Afghan refugees).
8
 According to Frontex, at least 145,000 
Afghans have crossed the European borders since 2009.  
Iraq has also been immersed in more than a decade of sectarian violence that has reached critical 
levels since 2014. Since the beginning of 2015, there has been a deterioration in the situation, due to 
the advance of the Islamic State towards Mosul and Erbil, precipitating the exodus of a significant part 
of the population. Most of these people fled towards Iraqi Kurdistan, but others have also tried to get 
to Turkey, Jordan, and Europe.  
Experts, politicians and journalists have, too, paid scant attention to the current situation in Eritrea 
or the possible reasons for the substantial migratory flows leaving the country. Eritrea is one of the 
most closed and repressive regimes in Africa, governed uninterruptedly by Isaias Afewerki for over 
twenty years. Both men and women aged 18–55 must complete compulsory military service for a 
period of around 18 months, but this can also last indefinitely.
9
 During this period conscripts are 
regularly subject to torture and sexual abuse, and many are used as forced labour in government 
construction projects.
10
 For these reasons, and also because the police operate a shoot-to-kill policy to 
prevent Eritrean citizens from approaching the border, Eritrea has been described as an open-air 
                                                     
6
 For example, during the weekend of 19-20th of September 2015, 2,000 migrants arrived in Italy. See Il Quotidiano del 
Sud (20/09/2015) “Oltre duemila migranti accolti in Calabria: Due sbarchi organizzati a Reggio e Crotone” 
7
 Al Jazeera (16/09/2015) “Afghanistan: The other refugee crisis”; UN News Centre (18/08/2015) “Record civilian 
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8
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9
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prison. This explains why since 2011, more than 80 thousand Eritreans (11,298 in 2013 and 2,600 in 
2012, according to Frontex)
11 have arrived in Italy using the Central Mediterranean route.  
Yet another root cause of migration which has been ignored is the link between irregular migration 
flows in the Mediterranean and the activity of the terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria. This terrorist 
group emerged in 2009, but it was only in April 2014, with the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls, 
that it made the headlines around the world. The increasing presence of Boko Haram in northern 
Nigeria in the last couple of years, and the escalation of their actions, meant that by the end of 2014 
over 1.5 million people had fled the conflict zone. In this sense, there is a link between the increasing 
violence in the country in 2014, and the dramatic increase in the number of Nigerians arriving in Italy, 
which shot up from 358 in 2012 to 8,570 in 2014. 
Therefore, several long lasting conflicts have worsened and coincided in 2015, leading to what the 
UN has referred to as one of the worse humanitarian crises since World War II.
12
 Taking into account 
this context, the next step is to find what it was that triggered the exponential growth in the route from 
Turkey to Greece since August the 9
th
.  
3. Why now and why so many?  
Although the current refugee crisis and the massive arrivals in Greece of migrants/refugees from/via 
Turkey since August caught Europe off-guard, the origins of this crisis were conceived a long time 
ago. Several events taking place in Syria’s neighbouring countries, but above all the events in Turkey 
and the decisions of the Turkish government in 2015, forged and triggered the present refugee crisis. 
As follows I will describe these factors influencing the uncontrollable arrival of migrants and refugees 
from the Turkish shores.  
3.1 Cornering Syrian refugees in Turkey? Contextual factors and policies at the European external 
borderlands  
Events and political decisions in Syria’s neighbouring countries have caused a funnel effect, cornering 
and concentrating a significant number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
Already at the end of 2014, the UN was warning that future crises of refugees were to come, when 
they announced that Syrian refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries were facing a disastrous and 
hungry winter due to the UN’s World Food Programme funding crisis.13 This insufficient budget has 
caused since the end of 2014 the living conditions in the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon to 
deteriorate, and in turn, many Syrian refugees to decide to leave the camps. 
Moreover, although Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt welcomed a large proportion of the Syrian 
refugees from the beginning of the civil war in 2011, since 2014 they have changed their policy 
towards them, and have reinforced border controls, seeking to reduce the number of arrivals. Due to a 
lack of resources and international support, and due to the fact that in countries such as Lebanon 
Syrian refugees represent 20% of the total population, Syria’s neighbouring countries have since 2014 
adopted restrictive policies towards Syrians not registered as asylum seekers. For example, the 
Jordanian government adopted in July 2014 a new policy consisting of cutting off any humanitarian 
assistance to any refugee to leave the confines of the camps without previous official authorization. 
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 UNHCR (18/06/2015) “Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase” 
13
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These refugees could be evicted, incarcerated or deported back to Syria.
14
 This explains why the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles has reported that many Syrian refugees are coming back to 
Syria from Jordan “rather than entering the country due to lack of means of livelihood, or in an 
attempt to reunite with family members who could not enter or were returned from Jordan”.15 
In addition to this, the EU fortification strategy in the recent years has indirectly cornered and 
concentrated migrants and refugees in Turkey, in turn making the Turkish-Greek maritime route their 
only escape option. This strategy has consisted in three main measures:  
First, in December 2012, Greece completed the construction of a 10.5km fence at its land border 
with Turkey. This 4 metre tall fence, made of strong barbed wire and equipped with thermal cameras, 
sought to prevent irregular migrants.
16
 Indeed, a year after this fence, situated in parallel to the Evros 
river, was completed, the flow of migrants and refugees crossing the land border reduced. They 
changed their route by increasingly attempting to reach the Eastern Aegean islands (Angeli, Dimitriadi 
and Triandafyllidou 2014). In other words, the 2012 fence, the Evros river acting as a natural barrier, 
together with the Greek-European border control operation “Aspida” (“Shield”) initiated in August 
2012, which included the deployment of approximately 1800 border police officers at the Greek-
Turkish land border, pushed migrants and refugees to use the Eastern Mediterranean route to reach 
Europe.  
Second, in November 2013, the Bulgarian government announced the construction of a three metre 
high metal fence with razor wire on its border with Turkey. A year later, the Bulgarian government 
announced the extension of the already 33-km fence built during the previous year, by a further 130 
km.
17
 Moreover, the fence is monitored 24 hours a day by around 1,500 border police deployed at 
strategic points to detect and prevent migrants from crossing the border. These policies seem to have 
dissuaded migrants from trying to enter Bulgaria from Turkey, since the number of migrants arriving 
in Bulgaria has decreased from 11,524 in 2013, to 6,023 in 2014.
18
 
Third, two events in 2015 concerning the Central Mediterranean route might have persuaded Syrian 
refugees to prefer Turkey rather than Libya as transit state before reaching Europe. On the one hand, 
the Central Mediterranean route might have become too dangerous in the eyes of Syrian refugees after 
900 migrants (mostly Syrian) died on April 19
th
 2015, when the boat taking them from Libya to Italy 
sank. On the other hand, the approval by the EU in May 2015 of the EUNAVFOR MED military 
European mission to fight people traffickers in Libya might also have played a persuasive role. The 
announcement in the media, that this operation was planning to attack smugglers and traffickers and 
dismantle their boats, might have influenced the Syrian refugees to switch from the Central 
Mediterranean route to the Eastern Mediterranean route.
19
 As we have seen, while in 2014 almost 41 
thousand Syrians arrived in Italy from Libya, this year only 7,000 Syrians arrived in Italy via the 
Central Mediterranean route.
20
 Moreover, at the beginning of October the EU Council agreed to move 
to the second phase of this naval operation, enabling the operation “to board, search, seize and divert 
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 Newsweek (08/10/2014) “Thousands of Syrian Refugees Are Desperate to Escape the Camps That Gave Them Shelter”; 
IRIN news: (08/01/2015) “A timeline of Syria’s closing borders”. 
15
 European Council for Refugees and Exiles (21/11/2014) “Increasing border restrictions preventing civilians from fleeing 
Syria”. 
16
 The Huffington Post (24/09/2015) ” Why Greece Shut The Shortest, Safest Route For Migrants And Refugees”  
17
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18
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 The Guardian (22/06/2015) “EU launches naval operation to monitor Libyan people smugglers”; VICE News 
(22/06/2015) “Europe Launches Naval Operation to 'Attack Smugglers' in Response to Migrant Crisis”  
20
 El Mundo (18/05/2015) “La UE aprueba la misión militar contra las mafias en Libia”.  
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vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking on the high seas”.21 However 
many migrants from other countries seem to not have been deterred at all by these control measures 
since the rhythm of their arrivals has continued at the same pace (see Graph 1 and 3).
22
 
In sum, this combination of events and restrictive policies has created a funnel effect, cornering and 
concentrating Syrian refugees in Turkey, by closing, step by step, all the doors by which they could 
get to Europe and leaving them two options: to stay in Turkey or to take a boat from Turkish shores, 
avoiding Turkish coast guards, to reach Europe. As I will explain in the next section, after a couple of 
years in which refugees stayed and found protection in Turkey, several events in 2015 pushed them to 
opt for the second option.  
3.2 A succession of events and Turkish decisions leading migrants and refugees to leave Turkey 
The role of Turkey in the current refugee crisis has been largely overlooked, although it has been and 
still is determinant. This role, however, cannot be understood without taking into account Turkey's 
geopolitical situation and geostrategic interests in the region.  
First, even though countries like Jordan and Lebanon had begun to close their borders since 2014, 
till the beginning of 2015 Turkey not only followed a policy of open borders for Syrian refugees (and 
other nationalities) but it also built new refugee camps and strengthened its coordination with agencies 
such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Solidarity towards refugees 
has been seen by some experts as a Turkish foreign policy strategy, seeking to gain a good reputation 
among Syrian refugees and the Arab world, and in turn, a major influence in the region in the near 
future.
23
 In part this explains why the number of registered refugees in Turkish camps went from 
1,060,279 in November 2014 to 1,552,839 registered by the end of December 2014, and 1,938,999 in 
August 2015.
24
  
This million refugees registered in less than a year is also due to other factors of a geopolitical 
nature. The advance of the Islamic State in the northeast, as well as the fact that some sources maintain 
that the regime of Al-Assad has gradually lost part of its territory, pushed many Syrian families to flee 
to Turkey over this year.  
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22
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Map 1: 
Military situation, Status of Border Crossings and Refugee Camps at the Syrian-Turkish Border  
Source: Institute for the Study of War (14/09/2015) 
However, during the year 2015 the Turkish government progressively switched its open border policy 
and most of the border crossing were closed. In March 2015 the Turkish government decided to close 
the Bab al-Salam border crossing.
25
 Moreover, in order to prevent Syrian refugees from getting into 
Turkish territory the Turkish border guards did not hesitate to open fire against Syrian civilians 
attempting to cross into Turkey through the western areas of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) city, killing at 
least eight people at the beginning of June.
26
 This Turkish fortification strategy, together with the 
advance of the Islamic State in Syria, has reduced during 2015 the territory and border crossings from 
where Syrian refugees might have a chance to leave the country and get into Turkey (see Map 1).
27
 
However, it was from the 20
th
 of July 2015 that a succession of events in Turkey and decisions 
made by the Turkish government were to trigger the current refugee crisis and the uncontrollable flow 
that started to arrive in Greece from Turkey, from the 9
th
 to the 14
th
 of August (see graphs 1 and 2). 
These events and decisions were going to affect, directly or indirectly, not only the situation of 
migrants in Turkey and Syria, but also the domestic and geopolitical context of Turkey, which in turn 
was going to have an effect too on migration flows (see graphs 1 and 4).  
A series of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil persuaded Turkey to change its involvement and 
position regarding the Syrian conflict. On July 20, 32 people were killed and over 100 suffered injuries 
in Suruç, a Turkish village which borders Syria, as a result of a suicide bombing carried out by an 
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 Al-Monitor (06/03/2015) “No sign of Turkey-Syria border reopening”  
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 ARA News (03/06/2015) “Turkish border guards kill eight Syrians for trying to cross illegally” 
27
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Islamic State member.
28
 A few days after, one Turkish soldier was killed when Islamic State 
militiamen attacked a Turkish border post. As a consequence, the Turkish government took three key 
decisions that show its increasing involvement regarding the Syrian conflict.  
First, the Turkish government mobilized about 5.000 soldiers, aviation, tanks and artillery in order 
to besiege Islamic State’s positions in the regions bordering Syria. Second, after having long refused 
to lend military facilities to the US-led coalition against ISIS, Turkey promptly changed its position 
after these terrorist attacks and agreed to let the US use the Incirlik air base, among others (see Map 
2).
29
  
Map 2: Turkish Airbases Opened to US-led Coalition (August 2015) 
 
Source: Institute of Studies of War 
Finally, on the 23
rd
 of July the Turkish government agreed to reinforce the Turkish-Syrian border with 
a “modular wall” about 150km long, including wire fencing and extra ditches.30 This decision was 
made to prevent ISIS fighters from crossing the border; however it is obvious that these measures were 
also going to make it more difficult for Syrian refugees to flee their country.  
These events were going to aggravate even further in the following weeks both the social and 
political instability in Turkey and the situation and living conditions of refugees and migrants in 
Turkey.  
The terrorist attack in Suruç provoked violent demonstrations in several regions of Turkey, 
including one in Istanbul in which a policeman was killed. Several Kurds were killed in the Suruç 
bombing, enraging the Kurdish minority, who accused the Turkish government of strategically 
backing the Islamic State militia in Syria against Kurdish forces. Two Turkish police officers were 
killed by Kurdish militants and a Turkish military base was attacked by PKK militiamen in retaliation 
for the bombing.
31
 As a result of the violent demonstrations, the Turkish Interior Ministry restricted 
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 The Guardian (20/07/2015) “'Isis suicide bomber' strikes Turkish border town as Syrian war spills over”  
29
 The Guardian (23/07/2015) “Turkey to let anti-Isis coalition use airbase after soldier's death”  
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 The Guardian (23/07/2015) “Turkey reinforces border with Syria in wake of suspected suicide attack” 
31
 New Eastern Outlook (02/08/2015) “Turkish authorities offer a unique response to Islamic attacks”. 
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the right to assembly and demonstration by granting the governors and district governors the powers to 
cancel any meeting or demonstration on the grounds of posing a risk to public order.
32
 
 
                                                     
32
 Hurryet Daily News (05/08/2015) “New decree to restrict use of assembly and demonstration rights in Turkey”; BGN 
News (07/08/2015) “Turkish government further restricts laws surrounding demonstrations”. 
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Graph 4: Chronology of the succession of push factors triggering the refugee crisis of August 2015 
Source: own elaboration 
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It is important to remember that in June 2015, Erdogan’s islamist right wing Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) lost its majority in the elections for the first time in 13 years, as votes for a progressive 
Kurdish-led party soared, and after weeks of failed negotiations, on the 21st of August Erdogan 
announced snap elections for the 1
st
 of November.
33
 All together this illustrates the level of instability 
experienced in Turkey at the beginning of August. 
Moreover, while Turkey agreed to let the US use its military bases, during the first week of August 
there was much speculation that in exchange for its cooperation, the US had agreed to establish a safe 
zone in northern Syria. This zone, it was suggested, would be safe in that it would be cleared of IS, 
Syrian regime forces and fighters of the Kurdish militia (see Map 3).
34
 However, the Turkish 
government insisted several times that the zone was going to be used to send back Syrian refugees to 
their country. As Turkey's Foreign Minister, Mevlü Çavuşğlu, stressed: "When areas in northern Syria 
are cleared of the [ISIS] threat, the safe zones will be filled naturally.... People who have been 
displaced can be placed in those safe areas."
35
 As several members of Human Rights Watch have 
pointed out, this safe zone is reminiscent of the tragic United Nations resolution 819 of 1993, agreeing 
to establish Srebenica and its surroundings as a “safe area” free from armed attack or any other hostile 
act.
36
  
The US has denied the creation of this safe-zone, even though on the 12th of August the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu announced that Turkey and the United States had 
agreed on the terms to establish a “safe zone” in northern Syria. According to Sinirlioglu, the safe 
zone would stretch over 98 kilometers (61 miles) in length and 45 kilometers (28 miles) in width in the 
north of Syria.
37
  
This announcement might not have been the actual trigger for the uncontrollable increase of 
arrivals of migrants from Turkish coasts from the 9
th
 to the 14
th
 of August 2015, but most likely it was 
one of the factors pushing Syrian refugees to leave Turkey. It is highly likely that 2 million refugees, 
who had fled their country to escape from war and the advance of Islamic State, were not willing to be 
sent to an area within Syrian territory that currently is still controlled by Islamic State. Moreover, as 
several journalists and also Melissa Fleming, Spokesperson at UNHCR,
38
 have pointed out, “Syrians 
inside and outside the country avidly follow the news (…). Many also fear the gates will close soon 
and the only time to travel is now”.39
 
 
In addition, from the 5
th
 to the 10th of August 2015 several events explain this huge increase. 
During this period, these events led to the intersection of two trends: namely on the one hand the 
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Turkish willingness and capacity to continue receiving, protecting and controlling Syrian refugees and, 
on the other hand, the motivation of Syrian refugees to leave Turkey to reach Europe (see Graph 4).  
Map 3: Possible Safe Zone and Military Situation in Syria in August 2015 
Source: Institute of Studies of War and Washington Post 
First of all, on the 7
th
 of August, the Turkish Minister of Labour confirmed that Turkey was not going 
to offer special work permits to Syrian refugees.
40
 It is important to remember that the 2 million Syrian 
refugees registered in Turkey do not actually have official refugee status. Instead, the Turkish 
government labelled them as misafir (literally, ‘guests’) and granted them temporary protection. In 
other words, Turkey is under no obligation to provide support for Syrians, and can send them back 
whenever it wants (Fitzherbert 2015). Turkey maintains a geographical limitation clause which allows 
it to consider exclusively asylum applications of people from European countries (Içduygu 2015). This 
clause disqualifies, therefore, a vast number of asylum seekers and refugees coming from conflicts 
such as Syria. Syrian refugees are not granted refugee status but instead a “temporary protection” 
which was formalized in April 2013 with the newly passed Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection.
41
 This Law ensured full basic services for Syrians in the camps, but limited services, 
healthcare and right to work for those outside them.  
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41
 See Içduygu (2015) and Law No. 6458 of 4 April 2013. See also ACNUR (12/04/2013): “ACNUR da la bienvenida a la 
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(Soykan 2012). 
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However, the fact that Syrians cannot get work permits explains why many Syrians are working 
illegally, accepting lower wages. This situation has not only led to the exploitation of Syrians in 
Turkey (including women and children), but it has also resulted in animosity, abuse, resentment and 
violence from the local Turkish population (Kirisçi and Ferris 2015).
42
 In many cities and towns in 
Turkey, tension is rising because in certain cases the Syrian population has increased to such an extent 
that it is even higher than the local Turkish population. In other cases, Syrians have been accused by 
the Turkish authorities of causing disturbances or affecting tourism.
43
 It is important to remember that 
only around 300,000 Syrian refugees live in Turkish camps, which means that at least 1.7 million 
Syrians live in other towns and cities in Turkey, sometimes surviving in parks and squares, hoping to 
find jobs, or constantly arriving in Bodrum and Izmir looking for smugglers to take them to Europe.  
Second, many Syrian refugees have realized that the war in Syria is not close to an end: quite the 
opposite. The Turkish-US agreements, the increasing involvement of Turkey in the conflict, the 
continuous support of Russia to the Al-Assad regime and the advance of ISIS to the Turkish-Syrian 
border, have together persuaded Syrian refugees that the end of the war is far away, and that to go to 
Europe is the only option, to live a life of dignity.  
Third, the Turkish situation has changed due to the increasing political instability and terrorist 
attacks. On the 10
th
 of August, two women shot at the U.S. consulate in Istanbul and at least nine 
people were killed in a wave of separate attacks on Turkish security forces, including a bomb 
explosion at a police station. These attacks took place as a result of the Turkish government decision 
to launch a crackdown on Islamic State, Kurdish and far-left militants.
44
 Moreover, the fact that during 
this week of terrorist attacks the parties negotiating the creation of a government failed to reach an 
agreement most likely created even more instability and lack of coordination, at the time when new 
waves of refugees were travelling to Izmir or Bodrum to take boats towards Europe.  
Finally a last factor may have had a significant effect: the increasing number of smugglers and 
traffickers taking advantage of the situation. With the unstable political situation in Turkey, with all 
the fears around the Syrian-Turkish border, the Turkish security forces have focused all their attention 
and resources on the fight against terrorism. This explains why refugees had rather better chances of 
crossing Turkish territory to the western Turkish coasts. At the same time, the smuggling and 
trafficking business has seen the Eastern Mediterranean route opened up widely; this explains why 
many tourist stores in Turkey display life-jackets or rubber boats in their shop windows, like any other 
common tourist product
45
 or why smugglers and traffickers have even advertised their business on 
social networks.
46
 Indeed, in September 2015 France’s Channel 2 claimed that a French honorary 
consul in Bodrum (Turkey) was helping with the traffic of refugees by sea, and that apparently the 
municipality and governor of the region were participating too.
47
 Altogether this has led many 
refugees and migrants from various countries to take advantage of the situation, to attempt to reach 
Europe.  
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In sum, the increase in the arrivals from Turkish shores from the 9
th
 to the 14
th
 of August 2015 can 
be explained by the convergence of several factors, but above all by the intersection of two distinct 
trends: on the one hand, the decrease of Turkish interest and/or capacity to keep giving assistance to 
Syrian refugees in its territory, and on the other hand the increase of push-factors motivating Syrian 
refugees to leave Turkey for Europe. Therefore it is most likely that both the Turkish Government’s 
and Syrian refugees’ position reached their tipping point (Gladwell 2000) or threshold (Granovetter 
1978) due to the events taking place especially between the 9
th
 and the 14
th
 of August 2015 (see Graph 
4).
48
 The intersection of both positions and interests during these days led to a situation in which a 
massive number of Syrian refugees decided to leave Turkey, at the same time that Turkey was no 
longer interested in receiving and controlling Syrian refugees within its territory.  
4. Turkey and the refugee crisis: A crossroads for the European Union 
The current refugee crisis has revealed a clear fact: the EU and the Member States are powerless to 
deal with the situation, and dependent on Turkey to stem migration flows. This EU powerlessness was 
evident when shortly after the exponential increase of refugees arriving on Greek shores (the 14
th
 of 
August), the European Commissioner for Migration Dimitris Avramopoulos said: "Turkey is crossing 
a turbulent political zone right now… We are waiting to see the outcome of the domestic political 
developments in order to go there and address this issue with the competent Turkish authorities."
49
 In 
other words, Turkey refused the EU demands to increase its resources and cooperation on migration 
control.  
It is hard not to suspect malice that Turkey might have used the refugee crisis strategically to get 
higher leverage power, as other countries have done in the past (Bensaad 2004; Greenhill 2010; 
Cassarino 2010; Paoletti 2011; Sanchez-Montijano and Zaragoza-Cristiani 2013; Del Sarto 2015; Del 
Sarto and Steindler 2015). However, it is hard to prove that Turkey pushed or even helped refugees to 
get into Europe since we have seen that Turkey continued to control and arrest thousands of migrants 
in August and September.
50
  
Notwithstanding, in a context in which a transit state (such as Turkey) manages to control its 
maritime borders with, say, X coast guard patrols to stop hypothetically about 20,000 irregular 
migrants waiting to sail to Europe, and in which this number increases dramatically in a short time to 
200.000 refugees,
51
 it is also true that it will be necessary to increase the number of X patrols in 
proportion to those numbers. Otherwise, a massive and uncontrollable influx of people will take place: 
which was the case here.  
There is one thing sure: whether or not Turkey prevents refugees from reaching Europe, the 
massive arrival of people in Europe benefits the Turkish position and it has increased its negotiation 
leverage over the EU and its member states (Del Sarto 2015, 10) in at least two dimensions.  
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First, the Syrian refugee crisis has drawn all the international attention to the Syrian conflict. This 
attention coincides with Turkish interests, since Erdogan for a long time has been asking the US and 
NATO members to take action to overthrow the Al-Assad regime. However, the current massive 
arrivals have directly transferred the problems and consequences of the Middle East instability to the 
heart of Europe.
52
 In other words, the massive arrivals have shifted some of the pressure to Europe, 
and in turn, NATO and EU members will have more pressure to act in Syria. This might explain why 
Prime Minister Davutoglu has repeatedly stated that the only way to prevent new waves of refugees is 
to stop atrocities committed by the Syrian regime and the Islamic State group.
53
 
Second, by engaging more intensively in the Syrian conflict (joining the US bombing of Islamic 
State targets), and by unilaterally assuming the cost of the arrival of more than two million refugees 
(Turkey has spent more than 7,6 billion dollars providing assistance to refugees),
54
 Turkey has not 
only gained international clout but also the leverage to negotiate, and refuse to increase its cooperation 
on migration control. 
Indeed, at the time of writing this paper, the EU and Turkey’s leaders have recently signed an 
agreement after meeting on several occasions since the crisis became critical in August 2015. 
Allegedly, the timing, and the continuous massive arrivals in Greece seem to be to Turkey’s 
advantage, since the EU and its members have been progressively increasing their reward/carrot to 
persuade it to cooperate.  
While in August 2015 the EU leaders seemed to be powerless to do anything but to wait the 
outcome of political developments in Turkey, in September they suddenly started to appear nervous, 
the European Commission agreeing to deliver 1 billion euros to Turkey to help it in assisting Syrian 
refugees.
55
 However, as we see in Graph 1, this EU concrete pledge of support did not seem to 
convince Turkish officials, since the huge numbers of refugees continued to arrive from Turkey. This 
explains why the EU increased its offer again in October, to persuade Turkey to cooperate on the 
control of migration flows. 
In October 2015, a succession of meetings between EU and Turkish leaders seems to have led to a 
deal between the two sides. At the beginning of October the Turkish President Erdogan considered the 
initial EU aid to be insufficient,
56
 after meeting in Brussels the presidents of the three main EU bodies: 
the European Council’s Donald Tusk, the European Commission’s Jean-Claude Juncker, and the 
European Parliament’s Martin Schulz.57 The Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister F. Sinirlioglu even 
qualified the first deal as “unacceptable” and as “political bribery”.58  
In response to this, and because of the growing anxiety of EU leaders about controlling the arrivals, 
an unprecedented and ambitious offer was made by the EU a few weeks later. This EU Action Plan, 
which was supported by Angela Merkel in her visit to Istanbul on the 18
th
 of October, consisted in 
offering, first of all, more than three billion euros to support Turkey in hosting over two million 
refugees.
59
 Second, Turkey would be included on the new EU “safe countries of origin list”.60 Some 
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human rights associations have already raised the alarm that this would mean that the EU would turn a 
blind eye to Turkish human rights violations. Third, Turkish citizens wanting to visit Europe would be 
granted visa-free travel. The EU road map aiming to grant visa-facilitation for Turkish citizens in 2017 
would be accelerated to 2016. Four, the accession discussions to admit Turkey as EU member would 
be reopened.
61
 In this sense, five chapters in Turkey’s EU membership negotiations would be 
unblocked: on monetary policy, justice, fundamental rights, energy and education.  
In exchange, the EU requested Turkey to give to all refugees the right to work and access to public 
services, to no longer treat Syrian refugees as guests with just temporary protection but to grant them 
with full refugee status, to increase the capacity and numbers of the Turkish coast guards to intercept 
migrants and refugees heading towards the Greek shores, and to fight and stem the smuggling and 
trafficking networks operating on both Turkish coasts and soil. Moreover, the EU requested Turkey to 
implement the previously drafted EU-Turkey readmission deal, stating that Turkey would take back 
those irregular migrants and refugees who had entered the EU from its territory. This has not yet been 
signed, and the Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu insisting several times: "We will not sign the 
readmission agreement before steps are taken on the Schengen visa and thus a visa liberalization is 
secured for Turkish citizens."
62
 
It is also important to consider the effects of these negotiations and announcements in the Turkish 
media in relation to the Turkish elections that took place on the 1
st
 of November 2015. In this sense, 
not only is it clear that Merkel’s declarations two weeks before the elections gave a boost to Erdogan’s 
party, but it is also significant that the European Commission’s Turkey Annual Progress Report 
(planned for October), which emphasized an overall negative trend in the respect for the rule of law 
and fundamental rights in Turkey, was held back until after the elections.
63
  
Finally, on the 29
th
 of November 2015 the 28 Heads of State or Government of the European 
Union, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and European Council President Donald 
Tusk met with Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu: the first time that the EU has ever held a full 
summit of 28 leaders with another non-member country. In this summit, the EU agreed three 
important measure. The first was to provide 3 billion euro over two years, for Turkey to fulfill the 
needs of the Syrian refugees living in the country. Initially Turkey had asked for 3 billion euros per 
year; however, as French President Francois Hollande explained, the money will be paid out bit by bit 
as conditions are met, leaving the total payout unclear.
64
 Second, the EU and Turkey have agreed to 
open the negotiations regarding Turkey’s process of accession to the European Union. On the 14th of 
December the discussions over chapter 17 (economic and monetary policies) will be reopened, while 
the discussions over further chapters are expected to come in the first three months of 2016. Initially, 
Ankara had asked to negotiate too over chapters 23 and 24 (judiciary and fundamental rights, and 
justice, freedom and security) but these two chapters have been blocked since 2009 by Cyprus.
65
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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Third, Turkey agreed to implement, as from June 2016, the readmission agreement, and in exchange 
the EU will lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone by October 2016.  
Therefore, as we can see, the refugee crisis has led Turkish-EU relations to an unthinkable point, 
taking into account that three months earlier the EU leaders preferred to distance themselves from 
Turkey because of Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism. However, the need of EU leaders to stem 
refugee flows and the effective Turkish strategy of using its new “weapon of mass migration” 
bargaining chip (Greenhill 2010), have totally changed EU-Turkey relations. In less than two months, 
not only have the EU-Turkey accession negotiations made more progress than in the previous 15 
years, but the framework of interdependence between both sides has made an about-face, Turkey 
having unprecedented leverage and the EU having an extraordinary vulnerable dependency (Keohane 
and Nye 2012, 10-11) on Turkey.  
5. Conclusion 
Today Europe is experiencing the consequences of not only a refugee crisis emanating from Syria but 
also an extremely unstable and violent context in Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, by fortifying 
the EU external borders, not supporting and sharing the burden with its neighbouring countries and by 
having previously refused to accept a larger number of refugees, the European Union and its Member 
States have indirectly provoked exactly what they have been trying to avoid for years: a massive and 
uncontrollable influx of refugees. 
In this paper, I have sought to explain the causes of the massive migratory flows from Turkey to 
Greece since August 2015. The context of conflict and regional turbulence in the Middle East, as well 
as the restrictive policies of the EU and the Syrian neighbouring countries, caused a funnel effect, 
cornering and concentrating a significant number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. This concentration, 
together with several events taking place at the beginning of 2015, in which Turkey was directly or 
indirectly involved, triggered in August the unprecedented refugee crisis that we are still witnessing 
today. These events led to a sea change, in the period of the 9
th
 to the 14
th
 of August, in the Turkish 
position towards refugees and in the Syrian refugees’ willingness to wait in Turkey till the end of the 
war in Syria. The intersection, during these days, between Turkey’s decreasing interest in receiving 
and controlling Syrian refugees within its territories and the increasing motivation of a significant 
number of Syrian refugees to leave Turkey, sparked the beginning of the current refugee crisis in the 
Eastern Mediterranean route. Finally, as I have argued, this refugee crisis has accelerated the EU-
Turkey accession negotiations in an unprecedented way, and at the same time has increased the 
leverage power of Turkey. In this sense, the events in the next months and years will be extremely 
interesting to follow. While the EU has frequently used migration control in the past as an excuse and 
condition to block or delay the accession of new member candidates (such as Romania, Bulgaria, and 
even Turkey till very recently), we might be witnessing the first case in which the EU is willing to 
speed up the accession negotiation with a new member solely because of its desperate need to stem 
massive refugee numbers and irregular migration flows.  
Analysing the Causes of the Refugee Crisis and the Key Role of Turkey: Why Now and Why So Many? 
21 
References 
Aljazeera (21/08/2015) “Erdogan says Turkey to hold snap election on November 1” 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/turkey-election-body-proposes-november-1-snap-polls-
150820080553216.html 
Aljazeera (12/08/2015) “Turkey's summer of mayhem” 
 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/08/turkey-summer-mayhem-
150812083149327.html 
Al-Monitor (17/09/2015) “How Erdogan exploits Syrian refugees”  
 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/recep-tayyip-erdogan-bashar-assad-refugees-
nato-syria.html#ixzz3mf5mYCOC 
Al-Monitor (01/10/2015) “IS intensifies attacks outside Aleppo” http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/syria-aleppo-isis-attacks-turkey-safe-
zone.html#ixzz3nKPugSYi 
Al-Monitor (25/08/2015) “Is Nusra cooperating with Syrian opposition to support establishing safe 
zone on Syria-Turkey border?” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/syria-safe-
zone-turkey-border-ypg-shamiya-front.html#ixzz3nKP4Qob6 
Al-Monitor (06/03/2015) “No sign of Turkey-Syria border reopening”  
 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/syria-turkey-close-border-bab-al-salam-
security-measures.html#ixzz3nKOgAEU4 
Anadolu Agency (14/08/2015) “EU eye Turkey 'developments' amid migrant crisis” 
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/eu-eye-turkey-developments-amid-migrant-crisis/10133 
Angeli, D., Dimitriadi, A. and Triandafyllidou, A. (2014) “Assessing the Cost-effectiveness of 
Irregular Migration Control Policies in Greece” Midas Report October 2014, Open Society 
Foundation.  
ARA News (03/06/2015) “Turkish border guards kill eight Syrians for trying to cross illegally” 
http://aranews.net/2015/06/turkish-border-guards-kill-eight-syrians-for-trying-to-cross-illegally/ 
BBC (16/10/2015) “Migrant crisis: EU backs Turkey action plan” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-34546482 
BBC (07/09/2015) “The 'vital' role of mobile phones for refugees and migrants” 
BBC (28/08/2015) “Europe migrants' life-jacket capital” http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
34073196  
BBC (10/08/2015) “Turkey attacks: Deadly violence in Istanbul and Sirnak” 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33844246 
Bensaad, A. 2009. Le Maghreb à l’épreuve des migrations transsahariennes. Paris: Karthala. 
BGN News (07/08/2015) “Turkish government further restricts laws surrounding demonstrations” 
http://national.bgnnews.com/turkish-government-further-restricts-laws-surrounding-
demonstrations-haberi/8336 
Breibart (19/06/2015) “New Refugee law keep Syrian refugees in limbo” 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/06/19/new-turkey-refugee-laws-keep-syrian-
refugees-in-limbo/ 
Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani 
22 
Cassarino, J.P., ed. 2010. Unbalanced reciprocities: cooperation on readmission in the Euro-
Mediterranean area. Washington: Middle East Institute.  
Cassarino, J.P. 2009. "EU mobility partnerships: expression of a new compromise." Migration Policy 
Institute September 15.  
CBS News (22/09/2015) “Refugee children forced into labor in Turkey” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/refugee-children-forced-into-labor-in-turkey/  
CNBC (11/09/2015) “How smartphones are helping refugees in Europe” 
CNN (15/09/2015) “'Facebook refugees' chart escape from Syria on cell phones” 
Daily Sabah (15/08/2015) “Turkish coast guard finds at least 500 Greece-bound migrants” 
http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/08/15/turkish-coast-guard-finds-at-least-500-greece-
bound-migrants 
Del Sarto, R. 2015. ‘Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the “Arab 
Spring’’’, Journal of Common Market Studies, doi: 10.1111/jcms.12282. 
Del Sarto, R. and Steindler, C. 2015. ‘Uncertainties at the European Union's Southern Borders: Actors, 
Policies and Legal Frameworks’, European Security 24 (3): 369-380. 
Del Sarto, R. 2010. ‘Borderlands: The Middle East and North Africa as the EU’s Southern Buffer 
Zone’, in Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaidis (eds.), Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, 
Conflicts and Memory in a Transnational World, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 149-167 
EFE Agency (12/08/2015) “Turkey relocates Syrian refugees to stadium in Izmir” 
http://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/turkey-relocates-syrian-refugees-to-stadium-in-
izmir/50000262-2686836 
Euroactiv (08/10/2015) “Turkey frowns at EU refugee aid plan” 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/turkey-frowns-eu-plan-tackle-refugee-crisis-
318342 
Euroactiv (22/09/2015): “EU summit to pledge €1 billion to Turkey” 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/eu-summit-pledge-eu1billion-turkey-317850 
Euronews (01/05/2015) “Is Bulgaria’s border wall forcing migrants to risk deadly crossings?” 
http://www.euronews.com/2015/04/30/is-bulgarias-border-wall-forcing-migrants-to-risk-perilous-
sea-crossings/ 
European Council (28/09/2015) “EUNAVFOR Med: EU agrees to start the active phase of the 
operation against human smugglers and to rename it "Operation Sophia"” 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/28-eunavfor/ 
European Council for Refugees and Exiles (21/11/2014) “Increasing border restrictions preventing 
civilians from fleeing Syria”. 
Financial Times (16/10/2015) “Merkel backs Multi-billion euro refugee package for Turkey” 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ba4ce796-7348-11e5-bdb1-e6e4767162cc.html#axzz3p3PFZIFF 
Fitzherbert, Y. (2015) “The Syrian conflict: Erdogan, Syrian refugees and humanitarian aid in 
Turkey”, Contributoria February 2015. http://www.contributoria.com/issue/2015-
02/54914fcfc3a4627d42000029/ 
Ferris and Kirisci (08/07/2015) “What Turkey’s open-door policy means for Syrian refugees” 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/08-turkey-syrian-refugees-kirisci-
ferris 
Foreign Policy (28/09/2015) “Turkey and Jordan to EU: Our Refugee Problem Is Bigger Than Yours”  
Analysing the Causes of the Refugee Crisis and the Key Role of Turkey: Why Now and Why So Many? 
23 
France 24 (12/09/2015) “French honorary consul in Turkey suspended over selling rubber dinghies to 
migrants” http://www.france24.com/en/20150912-frenchhonorary-consul-turkeyselling-boats-
migrants-francoise-olcay 
Frelik, B. (21/08/2015) “Safe zones name only” Human Rights Watch 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/21/safe-zones-name-only 
Gladwell, M. 2000. The Tipping Point: How little things can make a big difference, Boston, Little 
Brown. 
Granovetter, M. 1978. “Threshold models of collective behavior” American Journal of Sociology, Vol 
83, n. 6 (May, 1979) pp. 1420 – 1443) 
Greenhill, K. 2010. Weapons of mass migration: forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Handelsblatt (25/09/2015) “Clinging to a Smartphone Lifeline” 
Huffington Post (14/08/2015) “Turkey Builds Wall In Token Effort To Secure Border With Syria” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkey-wall-syria-border_55ce0de8e4b07addcb42c19b 
Hurryet Daily News (26/05/2015) “Syrians bussed out of Turkish resort as tourism season looms” 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/syrians-bussed-out-of-turkish-resort-as-tourism-season-
looms.aspx?pageID=238&nID=82989&NewsCatID=341 
Hurryet Daily News (05/08/2015) “New decree to restrict use of assembly and demonstration rights in 
Turkey” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-decree-to-restrict-use-of-assembly-and-
demonstration-rights-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86493&NewsCatID=339 
Içduygu, A. (2015) “Turkey’s Evolving Migration Policies: A Mediterranean Transit Stop at the Doors 
of the EU” Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers 15, 31 September 2015.  
International Business Times (11/08/2015) “Greece migrant crisis: 200,000 'ready to cross' Aegean 
Sea from Turkey” http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/greece-migrant-crisis-200000-ready-cross-aegean-sea-
turkey-1515049 
IRIN News (19/10/2015) “Briefing: The EU refugee deal with Turkey” 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/102128/briefing-the-eu-refugee-deal-with-turkey 
Keohane, R. and J. Nye. 2012. Power and interdependence. London: Pearson. 
Kirisçi, K. and Ferris, E. (2015) “Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees and the Challenges to 
Turkey— and the International Community”, Turkey Project Policy Paper nº7 September 2015, 
Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings.  
Missing Migrants Project of the International Organization for Migration: 
http://missingmigrants.iom.int/ 
New Eastern Outlook (02/08/2015) “Turkish authorities offer a unique response to Islamic attacks” 
http://journal-neo.org/2015/08/02/turkish-authorities-offer-a-unique-response-to-islamic-attacks/ 
Paoletti, E. 2011. Power relations and international migration: the case of Italy and Libya. Political 
studies, 59 (2), 269–289. 
Reuters (30/11/2015) “Declaring 'new beginning,' EU and Turkey seal migrant deal” 
Reuters (28/10/2015) “Withheld EU report raps Turkey on rights, media, justice“ 
Reuters (16/10/2015) “Turkey's EU accession bid not a matter of 'political bribery': AKP spokesman” 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/16/us-europe-migrants-turkey-akp-
idUSKCN0SA0YD20151016 
Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani 
24 
Reuters (11/08/2015) “Turkey rescues 330 Greece-bound Syrians amid record surge of refugees” 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/11/uk-europe-migrants-turkey-idUKKCN0QG17E20150811 
Reuters (10/08/2015) “U.S. consulate in Turkey targeted as wave of attacks kills 9” 
 www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/10/us-turkey-usa-attack-idUSKCN0QF0DT20150810 
Reuters (09/08/2015) “Syrian migrants flock to Turkish city for risky voyage to Europe” 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/19/uk-europe-migrants-turkey-syria-
idUKKCN0QO1AQ20150819 
Reuters (07/08/2015) “Turkey will not give Syrian refugees right to work - labour minister” 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/07/uk-turkey-syria-refugees-workers-
idUKKCN0QC1UH20150807 
Reuters (14/01/2015) “Bulgaria to extend fence at Turkish border to bar refugee influx” 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/14/us-bulgaria-turkey-fence-idUSKBN0KN1JG20150114 
RT (16/10/2015) “€3bn, visa deal & EU access talks if Turkey stops refugee flow to Europe” 
https://www.rt.com/news/318822-turkey-eu-refugees-plan/ 
Sánchez, E. and J. Zaragoza-Cristiani. 2013. "Crisis migratorias en Melilla: un Instrumento de 
negociación política." Notes internacionals CIDOB 71. 
Soykan, C. (2012) “The New Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey” Oxford 
Monitor of Forced Migration Volume 2, Number 2 (38-47) 
The Independent (05/10/2015) “President Erdogan shames EU with Turkish stance on Syrian refugee 
crisis”. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/presidenterdogan-shames-euwith-
turkish-stance-on-syrian-refugee-crisis-a6680846.html 
The Arab Weekly (09/08/2015) “Syrian refugees try crossing from Turkish coast” 
http://www.thearabweekly.com/?id=1545 
The Associated Press Big Story (28/09/2015) “Turkey urges renewed global efforts to stem refugee 
wave” http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6738a4f7b40844f0abfb95c2e141292c/turkey-urges-renewed-
global-efforts-stem-refugee-wave 
The Guardian (25/10/2015) “Six reasons why Syrians are fleeing to Europe in increasing numbers” 
The Guardian (01/12/2015) “1.7m Syrian refugees face food crisis as UN funds dry up” 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/01/syrian-refugees-food-crisis-un-world-programme 
The Guardian (24/09/2015) “Lifejackets going cheap: people smugglers of Izmir, Turkey, predict drop 
in business” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/refugee-crisis-people-smugglers-
izmir-turkey-predict-drop-business 
The Guardian (23/07/2015) “Turkey to let anti-Isis coalition use airbase after soldier's death” 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/23/turkish-soldier-killed-in-clashes-with-isis-across-
syrian-border 
The Guardian (23/07/2015) “Turkey reinforces border with Syria in wake of suspected suicide attack” 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/23/turkey-syria-border-reinforced-suruc-suicide-attack 
The Guardian (20/07/2015) “'Isis suicide bomber' strikes Turkish border town as Syrian war spills 
over” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/20/explosion-hits-turkish-town-near-syrian-
border 
The Guardian (20/11/2014) “Amnesty report reveals desperate plight of Syrian refugees in Turkey” 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/20/amnesty-report-desperate-plight-syrian-refugees-
turkey 
Analysing the Causes of the Refugee Crisis and the Key Role of Turkey: Why Now and Why So Many? 
25 
The Huffington Post (24/09/2015) “Why Greece Shut The Shortest, Safest Route For Migrants And 
Refugees” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-turkey-border-
fence_55f9ab73e4b0d6492d63ec12 
The Irish Times (18/11/2015) “Turkey and Greece see window of opportunity on Cyprus” 
The World Street Journal (10/08/2015): “Spate of Attacks Across Turkey Kills 6” 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-consulate-in-instanbul-targeted-in-terror-attacks-in-turkey-
1439196354 
UNHCR (2015) “Global trends: Forced displacement 2014 in 2014” 
http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html 
UNCHR Syria Regional Refugee Response (Turkey), 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 
UNHCR (18/06/2015) “Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase” 
http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html 
Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani 
26 
 
Author contacts: 
 
Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; EUI 
Via dei Roccettini 9 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Email: Zaragoza Cristiani, Jonathan <Jonathan.Zaragoza@EUI.eu> 
